ROLLCALL

PRESENTER: Matt Freeman, Vice Chairman

OBJECTIVE: Roll Call and Introduction

ACTION: Introduction of Board Members and OSBE Staff

BACKGROUND:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

ATTACHMENTS: Directory
## Agenda Item No. 01

**AGENDA**

**PRESENTER:** Mike Munger, Program Manager

**OBJECTIVE:** Approve agenda 12-07-2021 for the Office of School Safety and Security Advisory Board meeting and the September 27, 2021 Board Minutes

**ACTION:** Consent

**BACKGROUND:**

**PROCEDURAL HISTORY:**

**ATTACHMENTS:** Agenda and draft meeting minutes
NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING

IDAHO SCHOOL SAFETY AND SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
VIDEOCONFERENCE/ZOOM MEETING
CALL IN NUMBER  720-279-0026
PASSCODE: 760563

Idaho State Board of Education
650 W. State St. Suite 307
Boise, ID 83720

Tuesday, December 7, 2021
9:30 a.m. – 11:30 a.m. (MT)
(Note: North Idaho - Meeting Commences @ 8:30 a.m.)

9:30 a.m.  CALL TO ORDER – Matt Freeman, Vice Chairman
   o  Roll Call & Introductions
   o  Open Forum

CONSENT AGENDA

1. Approval of the December 7, 2021, Agenda and September 27, 2021, Minutes

INFORMATIONAL AGENDA

2. Office Manager Report – Mike Munger, Program Manager
   a. Announcement of Retiring Board Member
   b. Introduction of New Board Member
   c. SRO Update
   d. Manager Update

APPROVAL
3. Review Quarterly Board Meetings and Tentative Dates
4. Approval of Legislative Report Item

11:30 a.m.  ADJOURN

All times, other than beginning, are approximate and are scheduled according to Mountain Time (MT), unless otherwise noted. Agenda items may shift depending on Board preference 11/17/2021 TB
Idaho Office of School Safety & Security is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Join Zoom Meeting
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82834139986?pwd=Z2gzUXVJRldTSDBYTFd0dFVGVo0ldz09

Meeting ID: 828 3413 9986
Passcode: 251149
One tap mobile
+16699006833,,82834139986#,,,,*251149# US (San Jose)
+12532158782,,82834139986#,,,,*251149# US (Tacoma)

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+1 669 900 6833 US (San Jose)
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+1 929 205 6099 US (New York)
+1 301 715 8592 US (Washington DC)
+1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago)

Meeting ID: 828 3413 9986
Passcode: 251149
Find your local number: https://us02web.zoom.us/u/kjjbBLOj
Chair Wendy Horman called the meeting to order at 1:00 P.M. (MT)

**Board Members Present:**
Representative Wendy Horman, Chair  
Matt Freeman, Vice Chair

**OSBE Staff Members Present:**
Mike Munger, IOSSS Program Manager  
Tara Biddle, Administrative Assistant 1  
Elliot Cox, Southwest School Analyst  
Kayla Green, Project Coordinator  
Scott Greco, Deputy Director

**Board Members Via ZOOM Live**
Terry Cochran  
David Gates  
Dr. Becky Myer  
Senator Lori Den Hartog  
Alexandrea Phillips  
Brad Richy  
Dr. Eric Studebaker

**DBS Staff Members Via ZOOM Live**
Guy Bliesner, Southeast School Analyst  
Shanna Lindsay, South Central Analyst  
Mark Feddersen, North School Analyst

**Board Members Absent:**
James Fry  
John Ganske  
Perry Grant  
Suzanne Kloepfer

♦ **CONSENT AGENDA**

1. Approval of September 27, 2021 Agenda and June 1, 2021 Meeting Minutes.

   **MOTION:** Vice Chair Freeman made a motion to approve the September 27, 2021, agenda and the June 1, 2021 Board Meeting Minutes as presented. Board Member Brad Richy, seconded. All in favor, motion carried.

   **Roll Call:** Chair Representative Wendy Horman

   Terry Cochran  
   David Gates  
   Brad Richy  
   Matt Freeman  
   Dr. Eric Studebaker  
   Senator Lori Den Hartog  
   Alexandrea Phillips  
   Dr. Becky Myer
INFORMATIONAL AGENDA

2. Office Manager Report – Program Manager Mike Munger

a. Announcement of Retiring Board Member
Program Manager Mike Munger announced that Board Member Chief Fry will be retiring in December and stepping down from the board as the representative for the Local School Board. He thanked Chief Fry for his many years of service. He was one of the original board members in place since the office began in 2016. Chair Horman thanked Chief Fry for the time he gave to help this office launch and for the expertise he provided.

b. Completion of Transition
Program Manager Munger reported that the transition of the office moving to the Office of the State Board of Education (OSBE) has been completed and we are now located on the 3rd floor of the Len B. Jordon Office building in Boise. The transition went smoothly, and our team has been receiving great support from the staff at OSBE.

c. Covid19 Update
Program Manager Munger reported that the summer was spent working on what the school year would look like regarding Covid19. As it stands, currently the disruption to assessment schedule for the 2021-2022 school year is expected to be minimal and manageable. Analyst are proceeding cautiously, understanding that a school or school district can shut down at a moment’s notice due factors beyond their control when it comes to areas of infection.

It was also reported that the Governor extended the opportunity for state employees to serve as substitute teachers to assist schools in staying open. Program Manager Munger has encouraged staff to evaluate their calendars to see if it is appropriate to participate in. He feels this would be a great opportunity, especially for assessors who have not spent time in the classroom to be able to walk in the shoes of a classroom teacher. It is authorized for employees to substitute for 8 hours per week, 16 hours per pay period. This would be a 20% reduction in time given to the office so it is being evaluated what this would look like when it comes to completing the core mission of the office.

d. Rigby After Action Report
Program Manger Munger presented the Rigby Middle School After Action Power Point. The tragic incident at Rigby Middle School occurred May 6, 2021. We had resources in place to assist with the initial response and recovery effort. Once it was the appropriate time the Idaho School Safety & Security Program (ISSSP) followed our statutory mandate, which is to be able to gather research, research effective practice, and gather lessons learned.
ISSSP filtered through what was broadly applicable, what was specific to the time, place, location, and the elements associated with how the incident played out itself. The office focused in on those
lessons learned that were applicable and replicable throughout the state. The focus of the report is
to capture lessons learned from the response to the incident at Rigby Middle School and the
subsequent response and recovery efforts extending from the time of the shooting to the beginning
of the 2021-2022 school year. The scope of ISSSP is specific to school safety in publicly funded
educational entities, therefore the lessons learned are constrained to school safety issues. The other
element in writing this report is that this is an ongoing criminal investigation of a juvenile. ISSSP
did not request any criminally applicable reports, or anything associated with criminal prosecution
because that would not be releasable, and our focus is on the response. The second component is
that there is a lot to be learned that is contained in educational records. However, we did not request
any federally protected educational records because that is an area that was not part of the scope of
work for ISSSP. We did not go into the question of “why did this happen?” That was not part of
the scope and that would be inappropriate for us to go into that part of the story.
The timing of this report being released now will assist schools in making and updating emergency
operation plans. It is very important they have the knowledge gained from this incident. Lessons
form this report can be implemented in the planning stages of their emergency operation plans.
At this time Program Manager Munger explained the reports format. The first part is “Information.”
Information was gathered from onsite interviews with school staff, and emergency responders in
the field at the time. Those provided the broad framework for the recommendations shown here,
but the interviews themselves are not contained in the report itself. What is in the report is the
“Aggregation and Analysis” and also the “Actions” are the recommendations. There are 29
recommendations some of which are specifically to the individual school or could be replicable to
other schools. There may also be recommendations that can be implemented at a regional or
community level or have implications for statewide response.
Lesson 1 learned was regarding “Information.” Preventing acts of targeted violence within K-12
schools requires means and methods for gathering information of concern. This can be done
through a tipline, social media, and a strong climate and culture where children can share
information with trusted adults. The next part of this is evaluating information of concern using the
threat assessment process. This needs to be a fair and thoughtful evaluation using current best
practices. The last part is developing mitigation strategies based on the assessment of behavior and
having a management plan in place. In this case at the time of the publication, there were no
indications that the school was in possession of information that would have increased suspicion.
Lesson 2 learned was “Coordination.” Pre-planned coordination between school and local response
agencies is critical to a smooth transition between onsite response efforts and first responders
arriving on scene. In this incident there were strong community connections. It was developed over
years of relationships between the School Resource Officer Program and the school. The SRO had a clear understanding of what the SRO’s mission was within the school in terms of building relationships and fostering coordination and cooperation as a law enforcement officer. The Joint Reserve Deputy Program had also been in place for years and is made up of school staff and employees trained to work in a law enforcement environment. Although neither of these programs stopped this incident; the relationships, coordination, and the continual communication that had taken place leading up to the development of these programs created a stable relationship which helped improve emergency operations. The next part discussed was the Community Emergency Planning. One of the first interviews was with the Community Recovery Committee that had started only a few weeks after the incident and had developed from the relationships that had been developed in the community. This committee drove the recovery effort form a community wide perspective. This can be very helpful when thinking about resources available in rural and remote school districts. In many ways those community resources can be leveraged to assist with the schools. The last item discussed was the maintenance of effort. This is incredibly important as we think about our long-standing school safety efforts. Many times, these efforts revolve back to having someone that has been serving at the school and knows the layout of the school, the people involved, and who to call. This does not happen in a short time, but it is the continual process as people and agencies become connected around the idea of school safety.

Lesson 3 discussed the uniformity in training. With this there is continual maintenance of effort required. This is critical when it comes to response efficiency. In this school district, there had been stable training in place from K-12. It is understood that there needs to be some level of flexibility in how one will respond to an incident. Options based training is recommended but must include a structured framework and training based on situation awareness and decision-making. This uniformity will increase resilient response procedures that result in fewer casualties during acts of violence. Our office is taking that recommendation and updating the ISCRS protocol to include additional training elements that are associated with staying or remaining in classrooms in high pressure moments.

Lesson 4 discussed “Communication”. Clear communication is necessary for effective response and depends on adequate procedures, training, and tools. Communication is a common point of failure in emergency response in general. There needs to be notification authority in place and ability to communicate. In this case there was a delay estimated at 2 minutes before instructions were given due to not having a unified communication plan in place. Having a unified communication plan in place reduces confusion and misinformation. Also, clarity in words of notification is very important. For instance, “lock out” and “lock down” are easily misunderstood
in a high-pressure situation. One of the other elements observed is that as facility use profile changes, communications need to be reviewed and revised. In this circumstance some middle school buildings were transferred to high school buildings, but the PA System had not been updated to the high school’s system. Therefore, they were not being relayed the proper information.

Lesson 5 discussed “Reunification Plans.” This is much more difficult in preparing and executing than previously thought. Reunification plans consist of plans to reunite students with parents/guardians and document the transfer. It was quickly found in an incident like this the school involved cannot take on that process. The functional capacity of staff involved in an incident must be considered during planning. In this incident, due to planning that was in place and had clearly detailed the reunification process they were able to use a different resource. The district office quickly pivoted and was able to take over due to preplanning. It is a very important mission objective that will be added to the boiler plate plan for reunification. Another important element in planning is that a system of student accountability is critical so student records for the day need to be accurate.

Lesson 6 discussed “Mental Health Needs.” It is not the responsibility of the school to be mental health care providers, but they play a very important role. The need for mental health support following traumatic events can easily exceed the mental health capacity of a local school, district, or community. Additionally, the infrequency of high-impact events can compound the lack of resources with a lack of experience for those individuals tasked with beginning the recovery process. A structured framework for crisis mental health support is a priority recommendation. Community coordination of service is vitally important in planning. Support following an incident can be high but can also be very overwhelming for school districts, so this needs to be considered in the planning process. It is recommended that community, regional and state partnerships need to be in place to lighten the load for individual districts. There needs to be a plan on how to manage volunteers and incoming donations by designating somebody specifically tasked with volunteer and donation management. This is in our ICRS planning documents but needs to be elevated in discussion of school’s operation plans. In this case the community played a large role in assisting. The school did not have the capacity to vet mental health providers, nor did they have the ability to onboard students. The County Victims Witness Coordinator from the Prosecutors Office, and Region 7 Children’s Mental Health provided critical assistance in getting victims into the right pathway for treatment. This an area our office needs to improve in coordinating support.

Lesson 6 discussed “Maintenance of Physical Site.” This was an area of unexpected complexity. Physical site maintenance and logistical consideration after an act of school violence requires thoughtful planning to reduce trauma. One thing to be considered is all damage to the school that
could be associated with the act needs to be repaired, and who will repair it. It is recommended that an outside third party will come in and complete the repairs. This will be incorporated into our emergency operation plan template. Planning must also include a post-incident access to gather personal effects. Another element to include is reopening of the school requires due consideration of logistics and in some cases appropriate separation of duties needs to be in place.

This concluded Program Manager Mungers report, and the meeting was turned back over to Chair Horman. At this time Chair Horman reiterated that this report can only cover curtain aspects of this investigation related to the response and not the criminal investigation portion and opened questions and comments to the board. Board Member Cochran asked for conformation that the After-Action Report could be shared with the superintendents in his region. Program Manager confirmed “yes” that that is the intent with the document to assist other school districts to improve resiliency in capacity or help them change tactics and standards. Chairman Horman than asked if there was a plan to distribute the report to schools. Board Member Dr. Myer who represents School Superintendents suggested that she be able to distribute the report at their next weekly meeting to all the superintendent presidents of all regions in the state. Once that is complete the superintendent presidents can distribute the report to all the superintendents at their next regional meeting. Chairman Homan confirmed with Program Manager to proceed with forwarding the information. It was also recommended that analyst be available to attend those regional meetings when the report is presented and to be available to assist superintendents. Board Member Dr. Myer took the opportunity to praise the staff for their hard work and expressed how helpful this report will be to schools as they are in the planning process. Board Member Richy thanked the staff for all the effort in putting the report together. He then asked when the last time was the school had gone through an active shooter exercise because this may have brought light to communication issues. Project Manager did not have an exact date, but said it was within recent memory of those interviewed. They had a full lock down practice in conjunction with local law enforcement and that was their normal practice to work through that practice. Board Member Richy stated that it is important that all schools review any internal changes as they update their plans. He also stated that the Bureau of Homeland Security has a donations management person as well as a volunteer and faith-based coordinator and if any assistance is needed to please reach out. When it comes to crisis counseling their agency can also assist with mobilizing Health and Welfare. Chairman Homan then brought up the issue of trying to get a Health and Welfare Member Ad Hoc added to the board. After listening and reading the report she suggested the possibility of creating an Ad Hoc Sub Committee of this board specifically related to children mental health in crisis situations. We have learned from this incident and are able to create framework around available resources in crisis situations. At this
time, she asked Program Manager Munger’s thoughts. He stated that this was a great the idea. One of the lessons learned was that there are a lot of people that work in that space, but in many instances, schools don’t know what is available to them and don’t know the appropriate onboarding location. There needs to be a common operating framework for mental health crisis planning. Vice Chair Freeman stated that the Idaho State Board of Education could put that in place, and he did not believe that would need any formal action. He then asked what the composition of the committee should be besides Health and Welfare. Chair Horman stated to acquire that information from Program Manager Munger, Board Member Richy, and Brad Lambsen of Region 7 Children’s Mental Health to see who would best serve on that committee. She asked if any board members had any recommendations. Board Member Dr. Myer recommended a school counselor be part of that committee because they are interacting with children daily. She could recommend an elementary or middle school counselor for this position. Chairman Horman then addressed Board Member Phillips who wanted to make a statement. She wanted to clarify the chain of communication and make sure that this report and the information gathered would be distributed to the classroom teachers. She also thanked the team, and those who had boots on the ground and gathered the information to put together such a powerful report together. Program Manager Munger stated that the best way to get the information out would be from the superintendents distributing the information.

The office will incorporate a module on crisis decision making into the ISCRS Protocol. This will be a very important tool for classroom teachers. At this time Analyst Bliesner addressed the board and stated that some reunification exercises had occurred prior to Covid 19, and the building of a document that would give Idaho districts a template to work was in the process of being made with all the information now available to us. Chair Horman thanked Analyst Bliesner for his work on the reunification planning document and asked if there were any additional questions or comments. Program Manager Munger took this opportunity to thank the staff, administration, and community of Rigby for allowing the review of actions taken during this crisis. The commitment of keeping student safe was evident in every conversation that was had. This report will help assist schools in keeping students safe. Chair Horman also thanked all those in the community for their help during such a tragedy.

e. Staff Update

Program Manager Munger announced that Project Coordinator Kayla Green will be leaving September 27th on vacation and her last official day at OSBE will be November 12th to work for the State Controller’s Office. Project Coordinator Green addressed the board and thanked them for the great opportunity she was given at ISSS and for her time working with the board. Chairman
Horman thanked her for her years of service and for taking on the project of starting the tipline for the schools in the state of Idaho. Without her perseverance there would not be a tipline today. The report today showed the importance in having a tipline available. Chair Horman wished her well on her future endeavor.

Program Munger introduced Shanna Lindsay, our new analyst for the Magic Valley. She is in the process of getting her first round of assessments completed. Chairman Horman welcomed her to the team.

Program Manger announced since the office left the Department of Building and Safety, Deputy Attorney General Spencer Holm will no longer be the boards legal counsel. He introduced Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho State Board of Education, Jennifer Marcus who would now be legal council for the board. If any board members have any questions or concerns related to the board she can assist. Chairman Horman took this time to thank Deputy Attorney General Spencer Holm for his years of service to the board.

**The next meeting will be held Tuesday, December 7, 2021.**

*MOTION:* Vice Chair Freeman made a motion to adjourn the meeting  
*SECOND:* Board Member Richy

**2:41 P.M. ADJOURN**

________________________________  ______________________________________
WENDY HORMAN, CHAIR  MATT FREEMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
IDAHO SCHOOL SAFETY AND  IDAHO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

DATE  DATE
Agenda Item No. 02

PRESENTER: Mike Munger, Program Manager

OBJECTIVE: Office Manager Report

ACTION: Informational

BACKGROUND:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

ATTACHMENTS: No Attachments
### Agenda Item No. 03

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESENTER:</th>
<th>Tara Biddle, Administrative Assistant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVE:</strong></td>
<td>Review Approve Quarterly Board Meetings and Tentative Dates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION:</strong></td>
<td>Request Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BACKGROUND:</strong></td>
<td>This topic is addressed at the year end Idaho Safety and Security Advisory Board Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROCEDURAL HISTORY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ATTACHMENTS:</strong></td>
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Agenda Item No. 04

PRESENTER: Mike Munger, Program Manager

OBJECTIVE: Approval of 2022 Legislative Report Item

ACTION: Request Approval

BACKGROUND: This topic is addressed at the December Security Advisory Board Meeting scheduled Idaho School Safety & Security

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

ATTACHMENTS: Draft 2022 Legislative Report
# Table of Contents

Goals of the office ........................................................................................................................................ 3  
Progress of work ........................................................................................................................................ 4  
Grants ......................................................................................................................................................... 5  
Assessment statistics ................................................................................................................................ 6-8  
Addendum A - Rigby Middle School Post Shooting Incident Report ......................................................... 9-19
Mission

Goal 1: Develop and employ a comprehensive process and instrument for triennial school assessments and reports. [33-5902] (4)(5)(8)

Goal 2: Maintain accurate information on school locations and conditions, tracking facility additions and changes. [33-5902] (1)(2)(3)

Goal 3: Identify and implement multiple modes of support for the improvement of safety and security within schools. [33-5902] (1)(2)(3)(6)(7)

Goal 4: Identify and establish connection with the agencies, institutions and organizations that serve schools, school personnel, or provide some type of service useful for promoting safety and security within the school environment. [33-5902] (1)(3)

**PROGRESS**

Number of school campuses that have been completed in round 2: 190  
(goal 1,2,3)

Number of school campuses that have been completed last school year 20-21: 138  
(goal 1,2,3)

Current campuses in state: 733

Hours of training and consulting (goal 3,5,4)
- 2000 hours for 2020
  - Pandemic Planning
  - Major Incident Review
  - Reunification Plan Development
  - SRO Support Plan Development
  - Idaho Standard Command Responses for Schools (ISCRS)
  - Effective Supervision Practices
  - Behavioral Threat Assessment
  - Title IX Support
  - Emergency Operations Planning Support
  - Radio Communications Plan Development
  - COVID-19 Reopening Planning & Support

Updated Vulnerability Assessment to current law and research (goal 1,3,5)

Updated Vulnerability Assessment methods to allow for better data aggregation (goal 1,3,5)

Major Incident Review- Rigby Middle School Shooting Lessons Learned (Addendum A) (goal 3,4,5)

**SPECIAL PROJECTS** (goals 3,4,5)

- Program operations moved from IDOPL to the State Board of Education
- Expansion of statewide tip line: 116 schools are now enrolled

- **SEE TELL NOW!**

- COVID-19 Reopening Plans and Support
GRANTS

US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance: Stop School Violence Grants

- Grant #2018-YS-BX-0059 Statewide tip line system (See, Tell, Now!)
  - $195,465.00, 10/01/2018 – 09/30/21
- Grant #2018-YS-BX-0222, State of Idaho Threat Assessment Model for Schools
  - $344,970.00, 10/01/2018 - 09/30/22
- Grant #2019-YS-BX-0086 Enhancing Idaho State School Safety Center
  - $445,000.00, 10/01/2019 – 09/30/22
ASSESSMENT STATISTICS*

Customarily this portion of the report is intended to provide statewide aggregated statistical information to help inform policymaker and lawmaker prioritization relating to the current observations of K-12 student safety and security throughout the State of Idaho.

142 assessments were completed during the abbreviated 2020/2021 school year and all assessment documentation was delivered to local school boards and administrators. While the data is accurate snapshots of analyst observations at the time of the assessment.

However, aggregated data for this school year contains an exceptionally high degree of variance and an exceptionally low degree of confidence in representing the actual state of student safety throughout the state. While the date is accurate, it is not meaningful due to the following considerations:

1. Low Sample Size- The abbreviated school year curtailed the ability of the analysts to travel to and assess schools within their regional assignments. In the best of years, the annual snapshot only represents 1/3 of schools and the statewide profile must be interpolated from the data. This year’s small sample size makes the expansion of assumptions particularly misleading.

2. High Degree of Variance Between Schools- The unevenness of disease risk geographically combined with the high degree of local autonomy for education governance created a situation where there was an exceptionally high degree of variance in school operations between districts. The averaging that occurs when aggregating data on a statewide level when there is a high degree of local variance presents a skewed image of statewide student safety.

3. High Degree of Variance Over Time- The evolution of school operations throughout the school year proved to be especially damaging to statistical comparison this year. A single school may have moved from normal operations in the fall of 2020, fully remote learning in the spring of 2021 and then several modified/hybrid iterations near the close of the school year. Since Analysts are only present for a single day, the observations, while accurate, may not be representative and useful for long term planning.

4. Rapid Change in Risk Prioritization- The pandemic also represented a significant shift and oscillation in risk tolerance and prioritization. Schools largely (but temporarily) prioritized infection control measures over more “standard” vulnerability considerations. For example, evacuation drills were deprioritized in favor of physical distancing considerations or BTAM training was cancelled in favor of extra time to reconfigure classrooms for hybrid instruction.
Idaho School Safety & Security Program

The following is a systematic process that directs a school toward effectiveness in safety planning and implementation through:
1) establishing a multidisciplinary safety team.
2) creating a comprehensive safety plan based on the IOS3 multi-hazard vulnerability assessment.
3) aligning resources and efforts with the comprehensive safety plan.
4) monitoring progress toward the comprehensive safety plan objectives.

Domains within ISSP Vulnerability Assessment

Student Supervision:
Schools shall demonstrate appropriate student supervision across the campus, throughout the day, and at all school activities.

Operations:
Schools shall demonstrate safe daily operational procedures and practices.

Facility:
Schools shall demonstrate physical measures that maximize facility safety.

Security:
Schools shall demonstrate security measures that control space to prevent intrusion or victimization.

Policy/Training:
Schools shall demonstrate effectiveness by creating and reviewing polices that establish protocols, practices, and define training for a safe school environment. Training programs shall be aligned with safe school policies.

Community:
Schools shall demonstrate cooperative planning for prevention and mitigation of, response to, and recovery from all hazards effecting schools.

Climate/Culture:
Schools shall demonstrate an understanding of the relationship between safe school environments and a positive climate and culture.
Elements within Domains

**Student Supervision:**
- General supervision
- Specific supervision
- Indoor supervision
- Outdoor supervision

**Operations:**
- Visitor management
- Access control
- Communication
- Safety practices

**Facility:**
- Communication equipment
- Building usage and capacity
- High risk areas
- Maintenance
- Parking
- Safety Equipment
- Signage

**Security:**
- Outer perimeter
- Exterior Areas
- Internal Spaces
- Secure spaces
- Surveillance

**Policy/Training:**
- Discipline processes
- General safety policies
- Staff training
- Planning
- Specialized staff training
- Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)

**Climate/Culture:**
- Behavior support resources
- Mental health support resources
- Physical health support resources
- Community involvement
- Student engagement
- Social Skills programs

**Community:**
- Community resources
- Emergency management
- Medical
- Fire suppression
- Law Enforcement
- School Resource Officer
- Written Agreements (MOU)
Rigby Middle School Shooting Post-Incident Review Report

1 Scope and Focus

This document is not intended to create a coherent fact picture, determine causality, or assign blame. The sole intent of the document is to capture lessons learned and make recommendations for safety and security resources in keeping with the statutory mandate of the Idaho School Safety and Security program (ISSS) [ID 33-5906].

Due to the narrow scope of the task and the ongoing juvenile criminal investigation, criminal investigative records were not obtained by the interviewers, nor were requests made for educational records held in the possession of the school. Ultimately these records may become available, however the information contained therein was not available to the ISSS program at the time of the interviews and may confirm, refute, or alter the assertions contained within this document.

2 Methodology

One Analyst from the Idaho School Safety and Security program responded to the site of Rigby Middle School within a few hours of the events of the shooting on May 6. Additional Staff arrived the evening of May 6 following the conclusion of response actions for the first operational period. Staff assisted with the recovery planning on May 7-10 as well as the execution of the recovery efforts on site from May 1014. Additional intermittent coordination and support was also provided through the end of the school year.

Following the close of the school year, the office manager, and an analyst unaffiliated with the response efforts undertook a series of interviews with key staff and community responders focused on capturing lessons learned. These interviews took place June 1-4 and with a follow-up series on August 9-10.

The format of the interviews varied by location and by interviewee, but broadly the interviews were informal, and dialog was encouraged with a continual framing around the areas of prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery.
The response to the Rigby Middle School attack demonstrated the effectiveness of a planned, coordinated, trained, and exercised emergency operations plan. As with any incident, there will always be lessons to be learned and as more information becomes available those lessons may grow in import or detail, but the commitment to provide a safe place for students to learn and grow remains constant.

4 LESSONS LEARNED

Preventing acts of targeted violence within K-12 schools requires means and methods for gathering information of concern, evaluating information of concern, and developing mitigation strategies based on the assessment of the behavior.

Rigby Middle School (RMS) staff and other adults reported that students had knowledge of concerning behaviors prior to the incident which were not reported until after the shooting. One of the accused attacker’s classmates observed a drawing that depicted a gun and a school, and several students saw concerning postings on social media.

Other students also observed changes in behavior of the accused attacker, including changes in appearance, affect and social engagement. These changes coincided with the transition from elementary to middle school, so the change in behavior was not apparent to RMS staff as the accused attacker was in her first year at RMS as a 6th grade student. This information all came to light after the shooting during post-incident interviews.

Research indicates that in most cases of school violence, students are aware of concerning behaviors before school officials are, as was the case here. A confidential tip line helps to bridge the gap between student awareness and staff awareness of safety concerns. RMS did have a tip line available at the time of the shooting, but it was not emphasized to students during the 2020-2021 school year. Consequently, the new 6th grade students, which included the accused shooter’s classmates, likely had little awareness of the service.

Recommendation 1
It is recommended that schools implement confidential tip lines that can be used by students and others to promptly report concerning behaviors so they can be quickly assessed and managed. For a tip line to be most effective, sustainable maintenance efforts must be undertaken to ensure that each year students are aware of the use of and importance of the tool. Effectiveness of a tip line rapidly decreases through inattention and attrition if marketing efforts are not maintained.

ISSS offers all publicly funded schools in Idaho free use of Idaho’s statewide tip line: See Tell Now! Use of the tip line includes a dedicated point of contact, technical assistance, ongoing marketing and a 24/7

hotline staffed with trained professionals to assess tips for urgency when they are received – all at no cost to schools.²

**Recommendation 2**
One of the important lessons learned from research on both averted and completed acts of school violence is that attackers have used social media to communicate their intentions prior to a planned attack. If this kind of information is brought forward, an attack can be prevented, as happened in several averted acts of school violence. In the case of the RMS shooting, students reportedly saw social media postings from the accused attacker that were concerning but did not report the information prior to the attack.

It is recommended that Idaho consider implementing a social media threat detection system for schools in conjunction with the Idaho State Police Fusion Center. The Ohio School Safety Center has incorporated public threat detection capacity to help schools identify threat-specific social media communication. This tool provides the State of Ohio capacity and helps to protect all schools in Ohio by alerting schools and allowing them to take appropriate action if a threat is made towards them by any person on certain social media sites.

**Recommendation 3**
Once information of concern is gathered, it must be evaluated through structured professional judgment to make the best recommendations to support student safety. Research indicates that the most effective method for doing so is by use of a trained multi-disciplinary threat assessment team. In this case, the school district had received training on behavioral threat assessment team development and possessed an operational framework for threat assessment, evaluation, and management. However, a threat assessment was not conducted because there were no behaviors of concern reported to staff in advance of the incident that would have warranted such an assessment. If information had been reported, the plans and procedures for assessment and management of student behavioral threats was present, practiced, and evident.

It is recommended that all schools develop the capacity to receive and evaluate behavioral threat information using evidence-based effective practices. Many resources are available to assist schools in the development of the threat assessment process and team. Team development training is available at no cost to all Idaho public schools through the ISSS program as well as through national partner organizations.

Pre-planned coordination between schools and local response agencies is critical to a smooth transition between onsite response efforts and first responders arriving on scene.

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² Following the incident at RMS, several tips were reported to the See, Tell, Now! statewide tip line from unrelated school districts. These tips resulted in several successful law enforcement investigations of school threats.
The Jefferson County School District and local law enforcement have a strong and historic commitment to the School Resource Officer (SRO) program. This commitment had several collateral benefits on the day of the incident at RMS. Many of the first responding officers had previously served as SROs within the district and were familiar with district operations and school emergency plans, making it so there was a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities from the outset of the response.

SROs also provided a critical link in the development of a district-wide response framework. The program helped to train staff and develop site-specific operations plans as well as conducting an exercise program for staff and students. As a result, on the day of the incident, the response by students and staff was well-coordinated and largely built on the foundation provided by the longstanding commitment to the SRO program by both the school and local law enforcement agencies.

**Recommendation 4**

It is strongly recommended that all schools coordinate with local emergency responders in the development and practice of school safety plans. This coordination may take place in a community safety committee, through the development of an SRO program or through reserve deputy programs, as described below.

**Recommendation 5**

In addition to SROs deployed within the school district, the Jefferson County School District and Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office had in place a formal reserve deputy program. This program further supported strong coordination in an emergency by cross-training designated school staff to local law enforcement agency standards. Whereas SROs are primarily law enforcement officers within the school, Joint Reserve Deputies are primarily school employees, with certified law enforcement standards and training.

This cross-training and coordinated exercises are of tremendous benefit and are conducive to an effective, coordinated response:

- Responding law enforcement immediately recognize designated reserve deputies because of the training and exercise requirements of the program.
- Designated reserve deputies are effective response assets within the schools because they receive standardized equipment and training in interagency coordination, emergency communications, legal issues, and a variety of other topics; and
- Reserve deputies meet standard weapon qualifications, are trained, tested, and are authorized to carry firearms on campus as deputized law enforcement officers.

During the RMS incident, reserve deputies were not in the immediate area of the attack but were able to respond rapidly to assist with response coordination. Several post-incident interviewees substantiated the importance of the close coordination established through the SRO and Joint Reserve Deputy program, in the response and reunification phases of the day.

It is recommended that schools and districts explore the opportunity to partner with local law enforcement though a Joint Deputy Reserve program. It is further recommended that the State of Idaho explore strategies to increase training and support for SRO partnerships.
Uniformly trained and exercised emergency response procedures result in fewer casualties during acts of targeted violence.

Jefferson County School District incorporated a standardized response protocol that was uniformly adopted, trained, and exercised for many years prior to the incident. The response protocol adopted by the district preceded the development of the Idaho Standard Command Responses for Schools (ISCRS) protocol for the State of Idaho, but it incorporated many critical elements of effective response.

The response protocol adopted by the district allowed for some level of individual autonomy of response based on the immediate circumstances. Regarding lockdown or evacuation during an attack, staff were expected to make the best decision for student safety. Once lockdown procedures were initiated during the incident at RMS, students who were already outside did not reenter the building. Most classrooms were secured and students remained in place until the scene was stabilized. However, one class was evacuated from a securable classroom. Upon exiting the building, the fleeing students were fired upon by the attacker who had also moved outside.

When a district authorizes autonomous responses from staff in an emergency, it becomes critically important to provide a framework for good decision-making. A degree of flexibility is required for emergency response, but all decisions must be based on situational awareness. Research indicates that students secured behind a locked door are much safer than students in open hallways or common areas during an attack. The decision to leave a known safe space for an unknown space is not to be approached lightly or without an acknowledgement of significant personal risk to all involved.

*Recommendation 6*

It is recommended that schools use standardized protocols, language, training, and exercise for their emergency operations plans. All schools in Idaho have access to the Idaho Standard Command Responses for Schools, which incorporates all the elements above. Resources, videos and information about the system can be found at [https://schoolsafety.dbs.idaho.gov/idaho-standard-commandresponses-for-schools/](https://schoolsafety.dbs.idaho.gov/idaho-standard-commandresponses-for-schools/) Plan templates for each response can be obtained by contacting the ISSS program directly.

*Recommendation 7*

It is recommended that when staff are trained on options-based response for emergency situations training must include situational awareness and tactical decision-making.

*Recommendation 8*

Lockdown training and exercises within the Jefferson County School District had been in place for many years. This ongoing maintenance of effort substantially increased the effectiveness of the response during the incident at RMS. An ongoing commitment to training and exercise supports a predictable, effective response.

It is recommended that all schools develop an exercise schedule to practice and evaluate lockdown procedures at least annually in coordination with local first responders.
Clear communication is necessary for effective response and depends on adequate procedures, training, and tools.

The first areas to lockdown during the RMS incident were classrooms within the immediate area of the attack. Nearby staff secured their areas and attempted to contact the front office so the front office could initiate lockdown procedures, as this was the established protocol at the time. Even though the telephone system at the school had the capacity for an individual telephone to notify the entire school, it was not widely known or trained. As a result, the sitewide command to lockdown went out later than it could have had staff known and been trained on how to utilize this function on their phones.

**Recommendation 9**
Where applicable, it is recommended that all staff be empowered and trained to initiate emergency commands from their room phones to save critical response time.

**Recommendation 10**
The lockdown notification was delivered from the front office via the PA system. Interviews with staff revealed that the notification phrase was “lockdown, locks, lights, out of sight. Lockdown, locks, lights, out of sight.” This phrase proved to be cumbersome to remember and to relay during an actual emergency. While the mnemonic device may be helpful during training, it is recommended that a simpler phrase be used (e.g., lockdown, lockdown, lockdown).

**Recommendation 11**
As a component of the response, the co-located high school campus was directed to “lock-out” as a precautionary measure. The directive to “lock-out” meant the high school was supposed to lock its exterior doors to safeguard people inside and continue normal operations. The response commands of “lock-out” and “lockdown,” which sound similar, were confused, and resulted in significant information gaps as the high school locked down instead of locked-out. For example, because the high school locked down, they did not answer school phones as this was the protocol for lockdown situations. This communications blackout persisted at the High School through the initial stages of the response.

It is recommended that emergency commands are dissimilar in sound to avoid confusion. For example, under the ISCRS system, the equivalent directive to lock-out is referred to as a “hall check,” which is easily distinguish from “lockdown.” Notably, the group that developed the emergency command phrases used by the Jefferson County School District has since dispensed with the command to lock-out, and now uses other phrases that don’t sound similar any of the other commands. Jefferson County School District has already transitioned to the new notification phrases.

**Recommendation 12**
Overall, there were few areas of the middle school campus unaware of the lockdown notification, either due to hearing the actual gunshots or the notification to lockdown. One significant area disconnected from the middle school public address system were the portables 300 and 301. These portables were used by the high school at the time of the incident and were disconnected from both PA systems. Once the attack moved outside, the occupants of the portables were able to observe some of the events but did not hear the lockdown notification. Staff in the portables were able to render aid to a wounded student, but the students remaining in the portable classrooms had not been notified to lockdown.

It is recommended that campuses assess their grounds to determine if there are any coverage gaps in their notification systems. Gaps found should be remedied to ensure clear and timely communication.
Recommendation 13
School telephones were not an effective means of communication due to the high call volume at the middle school, and the lack of unaffected personnel to staff phone lines. Several facilities within the district reported failures of both incoming and outgoing phone calls due to the high volume. As a result, external communication was primarily accomplished by the district’s emergency notification system, which incorporated mass text, email, and telephone calls to parents. While this did not reach all parents in all circumstances, it reached more parents in a more efficient manner than any single method would have.

It is recommended that schools and districts employ multi-modal, mass communications tools to notify parents, employees, and off-campus students in the event of an emergency.

Recommendation 14
The first priority of communication to parents at RMS was to contact the emergency contacts of injured students and staff. Shortly thereafter, parents of uninjured students were notified using several methods. In the reunification center, students were encouraged to contact their parents using their personal cell phones and to share their phones with friends so they could do the same. In addition, a mass notification was sent to all parents informing them that if they had not been previously contacted, their student was confirmed to be safe. This helped to reduce anxiety for parents of uninjured students and allow for a much smoother reunification process.

It is recommended that parents be notified about the status of their children as soon as it can be determined. This can be accomplished through a variety of methods, including those described above.

Recommendation 15
There was no interoperable radio system in effect at RMS at the time of the incident. The location of the incident resulted in a multi-site, multi-agency response with no unified communications plan. Lacking a unified communications system resulted in most communications requiring face-to-face interaction between agency representatives or cell phone use between buildings. Both law enforcement and school staff reported that the use of interoperable radio communications would have been beneficial to the response efforts.

It is recommended that districts work with local response agencies to develop district-wide, interoperable communications systems to allocate and manage frequencies in an interoperable system.

Recommendation 16
Clear communication can also take place through equipment and procedural elements to improve emergency response. As was evidenced in this case, three physical communication strategies are recommended: Surveillance monitors, employee credentialing and wayfinding signage.

The use of passively monitored surveillance displays in the front office at RMS helped to gain a rapid awareness of the developing situation, including identifying the location of the incident, victims, and the early identification that there was only one attacker. These monitors provided a critical, tactical advantage during the response, evacuation and securing of the facility.

Responding officers reported that it was easy to differentiate staff from parents, volunteers and observers because of the conspicuous identification badges worn by staff as required by district policy.

Responding officers also reported difficulty wayfinding inside the school. Rooms containing wounded were called out by radio by specific room numbers, but officers unfamiliar with the building had difficulty moving to make contact because of the lack of orienting markers inside the building.
It is recommended that schools employ wayfinding signage, credentialling and surveillance monitors to convey critical information to emergency responders during the initial response phases of an incident.

**Reunification plans consist of plans to reunite students with parents/guardians and document the transfer. Reunification forms the bridge between immediate emergency response and the beginning of the recovery process following an event.**

As with many elements of emergency response, the value of a plan is in the planning. In this case, the district had developed and trained on reunification plans prior to the incident. Though several variables during the incident at RMS caused deviations from the original plans, the original concept of operations still helped guide reunification processes and actions.

**Recommendation 17**
One lesson learned is the importance of having a pool of unaffected individuals available to help with the reunification process. The original plan called for RMS staff to have a much larger role in reunification, but it was clear from the outset they did not have the capacity to engage in the reunification process in the immediate aftermath of the attack. The decision was made to staff the reunification center with personnel from the district office, and this proved to be very effective. According to the assessment of district staff, no fewer than 40 individuals were necessary to accomplish an emergency reunification of approximately 940 students without significant delays. The district office staff had the necessary familiarity with student information systems and were able to maintain the necessary pace to have students reunited with parents in rapid fashion.

It is recommended that schools consider the use of unaffected personnel to run the reunification process, and that this deployment be reflected in plans. This can be accomplished by utilizing district personnel, community partners or staff from other school buildings.

**Recommendation 18**
A critical component of reunification plans is the transfer of students from the classroom teacher to the reunification center and ultimately to an appropriate parent/guardian. Foundational to this process is the classroom roster and roll sheet. Although a process was in place at RMS to update the classroom roll sheets, the process was unevenly applied, and staff members reported needing to update the roll sheets by hand to begin the reunification process.

It is recommended that a designated individual(s) be specifically tasked with updating and collecting current class rosters during emergency situations, and that this role be specifically defined in plans.

**Recommendation 19**
Speed of reunification is a significant consideration. In this case, students were reunited with their parents rapidly, which allowed resources to flow to other necessary tasks following the closure of the reunification center. Most students were reunited with their parents within an hour of opening of the reunification site. However, 10-20 students were unable to be picked up at the reunification site and remained until the end of the day. An important planning consideration for reunification plans is the reality that some students will not be picked up early, and provision needs to be made for them as well. Several staff noted that for students who remained until the end of the day, finding engaging activities to remain occupied was a challenge.
It is recommended that emergency plans include provisions for a percentage of students to remain at the reunification site for an extended period. Thought should be given to food, water, restroom use, medications, and engaging activities to provide relief from the emergency situation.

**Recommendation 20**
The outpouring of local, regional, and national responding entities was strong and immediate. However, there was confusion about the roles, function, and responsibility of those responding. In addition, the donated food and other items required active management and had the effect of removing staff from other response priorities.

It is recommended that emergency operations plan templates contain a functional annex for volunteer/donation management.

**Recommendation 21**
During the first week back to school after the incident, the district activated a significant pool of substitutes to support staff. This excess capacity proved to be critical to ongoing education in the aftermath of the attack. Several staff members needed support after classes resumed, and the substitutes were ready to stand in at a moment’s notice should a staff member need to step away for a few minutes or talk with mental health support staff located on site. Most substitutes were needed on the first day back and the need reduced to near-normal absentee levels within two weeks.

It is recommended that on-site substitute teachers be available to support continuity of education in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event.

The need for mental health support following traumatic events can easily exceed the mental health capacity of a local school, district, or community. Additionally, the infrequency of high-impact events can compound the lack of resources with a lack of experience for those individuals tasked with beginning the recovery process.

**Recommendation 22**
The first few days back to school following a violent attack require special planning and coordination. Following the incident at RMS, the decision was made to delay the return to school for a day to support and coordinate with staff. The additional day was used to communicate the facts to all staff members, provide a critical stress debriefing opportunity, introduce opportunities for mental health support and develop a plan for a controlled reopening of schools. Without exception, all interviewed staff agreed that this day generally, and the critical stress debriefing specifically, were crucial for recovery and restarting schools.

It is recommended that in the aftermath of a traumatic event, a sufficient period be reserved for staff support prior to student return. This should include time to inform staff of critical information, provide access pathways for additional support services, conduct a critical stress debriefing to affected staff and address logistical concerns.

**Recommendation 23**
While there were significant levels of community support in place for staff and students, leveraging regional and state mental health agency resources was critical for long-term recovery. Region 7 Children’s Mental Health (CMH7) was able to coordinate with local providers and agencies to develop a
single onboarding process for inducting individuals seeking additional support. This single sign-up was immensely helpful to the district to help students, staff and families begin to negotiate the path to gaining mental health supports. CMH7 was also able to help manage the outpouring of volunteer mental health support while validating and vetting through their network.

It is recommended that schools coordinate with regional and statewide mental health support agencies and include them as part of mental health crisis planning.

**Recommendation 24**
In the days following the incident at RMS, neighboring school districts provided trained school counselors to RMS. These counselors provided student assistance and worked within an overhead planning team to develop a support strategy for students returning to school. Staff reported that without the additional school counselors loaned from neighboring districts, the district counseling staff would have been overwhelmed with student support needs.

It is recommended that districts develop agreements (MOUs) with neighboring school districts for the cooperative use of school counselors in the event of a major traumatic event. Further, it is recommended that a common statewide plan template and training be developed to allow for uniformity of response to school mental health crises. This statewide plan should coordinate between behavioral health agencies and school practitioners (school administrators, counselors, and psychologists).

**Recommendation 25**
In addition to the increased counselors and substitutes at RMS, many parents, community members and agency staff remained at the school for the first week following the return. Staff reported that some students appreciated the show of community support, while others found it to be a detraction from the return to normal.

It is recommended that schools monitor the levels of additional adults throughout the first few weeks of recovery and scale down as necessary to meet student needs. Large impact events may require a formal demobilization plan.

**Recommendation 26**
In addition to the other mental health supports noted above, staff reported that the presence of certified therapy dogs helped some students to emotionally regulate themselves. Some students responded best to professional counseling, and some to group work.

It is recommended that following a traumatic incident, schools consider using a variety of research supported strategies to aid in building student capacity for social-emotional regulation and coping skills for grief and loss.

**Recommendation 27**
A community-based recovery team was able to stand up within the first few weeks following the incident to coordinate long-term recovery needs, specifically focused on the summer months when students and staff may be without support. These local recovery initiatives broadened the network of services available and leveraged awareness to reach underserved populations affected by the incident. This recovery team included representation from local law enforcement, schools, victim’s services agencies, prosecutor’s offices, and county emergency management.

It is recommended that long-term recovery efforts be primarily guided by local community agencies, who are typically best positioned to understand local needs, priorities, and resources.
Physical site maintenance and logistical considerations after an act of school violence requires thoughtful planning to reduce additional trauma.

Recommendation 28
Before students returned to RMS, district maintenance staff repaired all visible damage from the attack. This task revealed two significant lessons. First, evidence of the attack should be repaired or cleaned before resuming school, but this task may cause additional trauma for individuals. Second, even damage not directly related to the incident may have a traumatizing effect on students. District maintenance staff took the thoughtful action of filling all pre-existing holes throughout the building to prevent rumors. When students returned to school, there was no actual or perceived evidence of an attack.

It is recommended that provisions be made in emergency plans for third-party restoration services to address repairs or cleanup that may be hazardous, either emotionally or physically. As part of this, crews should address any damage that could be perceived to have originated in the attack.

Recommendation 29
Some students needed to gather their personal items from various areas of the school before the repairs were completed, including backpacks, medication, personal electronics, etc. To accommodate this, a guided escort process was developed and established. Parents were allowed to travel to the school site and were given their student’s personal belongings in a process controlled and guided by school staff. This was necessary to prevent access to areas of the school being repaired.

It is recommended that emergency operations plans make provision for returning important personal items following an incident but before full reopening in cases where students and staff were evacuated.